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Editors’Summary
THE BROOKINGS PANEL on Economic Activity held its seventy-first
conference in Washington, D.C., on March 29 and 30, 2001. This issue of
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity includes the papers and discus-
sions presented at the conference. The ﬁrst paper investigates the causes of
the Russian financial crisis of 1998 and evaluates the emergency interna-
tional effort that was undertaken to avert the crisis. The second paper stud-
ies the effect of interstate wage differences on the location decisions of
immigrants and estimates the resulting gains in macroeconomic efﬁciency.
The first report analyzes whether the decreased frequency of recessions
in the past two decades can be attributed to a secular decline in the vari-
ability of quarter-to-quarter changes in output. The second report examines
the usefulness of the Index of Consumer Sentiment as a tool for forecast-
ing recessions. The issue concludes with a symposium of three papers on
the sustainability of the recent large current account deficits in the U.S.
balance of payments. Each takes a somewhat different approach to under-
standing these deficits. The first symposium paper sees U.S. assets as
attractive investments that are likely to perpetuate large capital account
surpluses. The second focuses on entrenched global demand for the dol-
lar as international money. The third paper views capital ﬂows in terms of
a country portfolio model in which investors at home and abroad increase
or reduce their holdings of U.S. assets in response to changes in wealth and
in risk-adjusted returns.
IN THE SUMMER OF 1998 the flight of capital from Russia in the face of
failed attempts by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and others to
stabilize the ruble caused a crisis that reverberated throughout the world’s
ﬁnancial markets. The IMF had sought to avoid the inﬂation and ﬁnancial
market disruption that a sharp devaluation might bring and to encourage
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failed, inflation soared, output declined, and the reformist government of
Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko fell. The Russian meltdown was followed
by sharp declines in stock markets worldwide; it also led to massive losses
at Long Term Capital Management, a large U.S.-based hedge fund, whose
potential failure U.S. authorities and other knowledgeable observers saw
as a threat to the financial system. In the first paper of this issue, Homi
Kharas, Brian Pinto, and Sergei Ulatov analyze the Russian crisis and the
response of the international community.
The authors first review the economic situation in Russia in the years
leading up to the crisis. The policy of stabilizing the exchange rate around
a crawling peg had helped bring annual inﬂation down from 200 percent in
1994 to near 10 percent in 1997. But otherwise performance had been
dismal. National output, which had fallen by 40 percent between 1990 and
1995, continued to stagnate or decline over the next two years. And Rus-
sia’s financial situation worsened after the East Asian crisis started in the
summer of 1997. In the first half of that year, foreign investment in Rus-
sian equities and government short-term debt had risen sharply, raising the
foreign reserves of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) to $25 billion by
July. But by the fall, some of the capital inﬂows had reversed and interest
rates on GKOs (short-term government debt instruments) were rising.
Under pressure from the IMF, the government formulated a new Fiscal
Action Plan designed to increase tax collection and control expenditure. In
subsequent months such commitments to reform would be repeated in the
face of growing skepticism about the government’s ability to deliver on
them. And by the late spring of 1998, in an environment of rising interest
rates and falling oil prices, the third and final bout of instability began,
coincident with the crisis in Indonesia.
The international ﬁnancial community reacted forcefully. In June 1998
the IMF released a $670 million tranche of a previously negotiated loan,
and in July an IMF-led rescue package totaling $22.6 billion was
announced, with funds committed mainly from the IMF and the World
Bank but including $1.5 billion from the government of Japan. Only about
one quarter of this scheduled total was actually disbursed before the ruble
collapsed. The July package included requirements for ﬁscal and structural
reforms and was accompanied by a plan for a market-based debt swap of
GKOs, whose interest rates had soared to over 100 percent in July, for
dollar-denominated Eurobonds. The Russian government had already used
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The prospects for success of the support package and the debt swap
were closely interrelated. It was crucial that the support package, with
its massive financial support conditioned on fiscal and structural reform,
restore investor confidence. If it did, capital flight and pressure on the
ruble would abate, avoiding faster inflation, reducing ruble interest rates,
and buying time for the implementation of reforms. Additionally, the
reduction in government borrowing costs, arising both from lower ruble
interest rates and from the swap to dollar-denominated debt, would
improve the fiscal outlook, helping justify investors’continued confi-
dence. But the effort failed. Capital outflows continued, and Russian
banks with foreign exchange exposure came under pressure. On
August 17, 1998, the government devalued the ruble, restructured its
ruble debt, and imposed a ninety-day moratorium on private foreign prin-
cipal payments. Three weeks and $3 billion in lost reserves later, Russia
floated the ruble, which by the fall of that year was fluctuating around a
rate roughly one-third its previously pegged value.
The authors inform their analysis of the Russian crisis with reference to
two recent types of model of speculative attacks on a currency. First-
generation models emphasize unsustainable policy fundamentals, which
lead to speculative attacks once it becomes apparent that the reserves
available to support an overvalued currency are inadequate. Second-
generation models emphasize the possibility of multiple equilibria and
shifting market expectations. In these models, even if the currency is not
overvalued, sudden capital outﬂows precipitated by a shock to market con-
fidence can cause a self-fulfilling crisis that shifts the exchange rate to a
new, lower equilibrium. The authors recognize that, in any real-world
situation, confidence and the fundamentals are intertwined, but they
emphasize a first-generation explanation for the Russian crisis, focusing
on a fiscal situation and an exchange rate that they conclude were
unsustainable.
The authors see Russia’s fiscal dynamics in the years immediately
preceding the crisis as driven by the interaction of three main factors relat-
ing to both policy and performance. First, the crawling peg exchange rate
that was used to slow inflation in the three years preceding the crisis
allowed a 40 percent real appreciation of the ruble. The resulting over-
valuation together with high real ruble interest rates depressed output and
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unable to collect sufficient revenue, both because of the output depres-
sion and because of the “nonpayments system”—growing tax arrears and
the increasing use of nonmonetary exchange within the business sector—
that arose to prop up otherwise failing enterprises. Third, the government
took on new, dollar-denominated debt to augment its reserves, a strategy
that added to the ﬁnancial risk of the government and the banking system.
For a time, the relatively low interest rate that was paid on foreign
currency–denominated debt, which in 1995 represented 76 percent of total
government debt, alongside still rapid domestic inflation, kept the debt-to-
GDP ratio from rising despite large ﬁscal deﬁcits. But this situation, which
the authors regard as “one-shot gains from a real appreciation,” could not
continue without fundamental improvement in the fiscal balance. The
authors estimate that by the spring of 1998, with a target fiscal deficit of
$25 billion of which $19 billion would be financed with ruble debt, the
weighted real marginal interest cost of government borrowing would be
27 percent—a rate that would lead to explosive debt growth.
The authors point to rising market interest rates during the immediate
precrisis period as direct evidence of the increasing risk that investors
saw in Russian debt. The spread on new issues of Russian Eurobonds over
U.S. Treasury securities rose from 375 basis points to 753 basis points
between June 1997 and June 1998, and to 940 basis points by the time of
the July 24 swap of Eurobonds for GKOs. Domestic interest rates were ris-
ing even more sharply. To quantify the markets’changing evaluation of
risk on ruble securities, the authors use a model that equates the one-year
GKO rate to the sum of four elements: the one-year U.S. Treasury rate
(which represents the risk-free rate); the target rate of ruble devaluation;
default risk, measured by the yield difference between dollar-denominated
Russian Eurobonds and U.S. Treasuries; and devaluation risk, the resid-
ual difference between the GKO yield and the other three elements. They
show that both default risk and devaluation risk rose in the fall of 1997,
after the spread of the Thai crisis to other Asian markets. Both rose sharply
again starting in June 1998. On August 14, the last business day before
the devaluation, the yield on GKOs reached 145 percent, of which the
authors attribute 24 percentage points to default risk and 110 percentage
points to devaluation risk.
The authors see the increasingly precarious position of the major Rus-
sian banks as contributing to the timing of the crisis. The banks, which had
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were vulnerable to a devaluation, both from their own foreign currency
exposure and from capital losses they would incur on their holdings of
government debt. The authors suggest that some market participants may
have expected that the government would find a way to forestall a crisis
until the banks’exposure had been reduced. However, when the markets
did not respond favorably to the swap of Eurobonds for GKOs, the banks
were forced to liquidate both ruble- and dollar-denominated assets,
depressing their prices and adding to their perceived riskiness, thus help-
ing precipitate the crisis. 
Even with hindsight, it is difficult to judge what chance of success the
IMF-led program had ex ante. The authors recognize that uncertainty will
always surround attempts to stabilize volatile markets, especially in
economies like Russia’s, which are highly vulnerable to shifts in interna-
tional capital ﬂows. However, they observe that the very crisis the IMF and
others had sought to avert led to conditions that ultimately fostered recov-
ery. The crisis forced the long-postponed fiscal reforms by suspending
the government’s access to borrowing, it accomplished a real devaluation
that improved the proﬁtability of domestic industry, and it reduced the real
value of public debt through inflation. The authors suggest that, in the
Russian case, it might have been preferable to deliberately change the
exchange rate and reach an agreement with creditors ahead of a crisis,
rather than take the risk that the markets would force the same actions at
a higher cost, as they eventually did.
AFTER SEVERAL DECADES OF relatively low immigration in the mid-
twentieth century, immigration has again become an important source of
growth in the U.S. population. Legal immigrants who arrived in the United
States between 1990 and 2000 make up about 4 percent of the current pop-
ulation and are responsible for one-third of the increase in the population
over that period. In addition, nearly 4 percent of the current population
are naturalized citizens. Perhaps the most important effect of immigra-
tion is that it enriches the nation’s cultural diversity. But it also has
signiﬁcant effects on the economy, affecting the average age, skill endow-
ment, and geographical distribution of the labor force. The consequences
for the wages and welfare of the native population are matters of contro-
versy. Increases in the supply of particular skills due to immigration may
depress the wages of native workers with the same skills but may also
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regions and will in general raise the returns to capital. In the second paper
of this issue, George Borjas investigates the determinants of the location
choices and mobility of immigrants and analyzes how these choices affect
the returns to native capital and labor.
Labor market efﬁciency requires that the value of the marginal product
of labor be equalized across labor markets in the country’s various regions.
But even in the United States, with its highly developed capital markets
and relatively flexible labor markets, the convergence of incomes across
regions is quite slow. Indeed, available evidence suggests that it takes
roughly thirty years to eliminate half of initial income differentials across
states. Although interstate wage differentials provide an incentive to work-
ers to move, there are substantial impediments to their doing so. These
include not just the costs of moving family and possessions, but also the
incremental costs of searching for a job, selling a home and buying a new
one, changing schools and doctors, and the cost of having to leave
extended family members behind. Capital ﬂows across localities help equi-
librate the national economy, but because moving existing physical capital
is expensive, the adjustment of capital stocks depends largely on new
investment and therefore can take many years. 
Given the slow and costly adjustment of both native workers and capi-
tal, immigrants can play an important role in equilibrating labor markets.
Immigrants, in contrast to native workers, have already made the decision
to incur the costs of relocation, and if their objective is to maximize their
income, the differences in costs and beneﬁts across different regions in the
United States will determine where they settle. On the hypothesis that
immigrants are drawn to those regions that offer them the highest wages
for their skills, they can be credited with speeding the elimination of wage
differentials and so reducing the need for the costly migration of natives. 
Borjas observes that the hypothesis that economic incentives play an
important role in immigrants’location decisions has a number of testable
implications. According to this hypothesis, the observed geographic dis-
tribution of immigrants should differ from that of natives, even after con-
trolling for differences in age, sex, and education. Immigrants should tend
to be more tightly clustered in those states that offer them the best eco-
nomic opportunities, and if the pattern of wage rates across regions dif-
fers by skill class, immigrants with different skills should be found living
in different regions. Moreover, because economic opportunities across
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the same relocation costs as do natives, workers who arrived in earlier
immigrant waves should be found living in different states than the newest
immigrants. Recent movers, on the other hand, whether native or foreign
born, should be sensitive to interstate wage differentials in the same way
as new immigrants.
Before undertaking his empirical investigation, Borjas provides a theo-
retical analysis of how immigration and the location decisions of immi-
grants affect the returns to domestic capital and labor. He assumes a
competitive model with a single final product produced jointly by capital
and labor under constant returns to scale. The model has two regions,
each with the same production function. Using this model, Borjas ﬁrst ana-
lyzes the short-run impact of immigration, taking as given the capital stock
and native labor supply and their distribution across regions. In a compet-
itive market, wages equal workers’marginal product; thus the last immi-
grant to enter a particular region’s labor force receives the entire increase
in output that he or she generates.
However, a ﬁnite increase in a region’s labor supply, given ﬁxed capital,
decreases the marginal product of labor and hence the wages of infra-
marginal workers, including earlier immigrants, and increases the mar-
ginal product of and total returns to capital. Because inframarginal
immigrants also find their wages lowered by other immigrants, the gain
to capital from immigration equals the sum of the losses to native labor
and inframarginal immigrants. In models like Borjas’s, which take the cap-
ital stock as given, the redistribution between capital and labor is sub-
stantial, and most of labor’s loss is borne by native labor.
How do the speciﬁc location decisions of immigrants affect the magni-
tude and distribution of gains and losses, taking domestic factors as ﬁxed?
To illuminate the answer, Borjas assumes an identical production func-
tion for each region, with a linear marginal product of labor schedule.
Under this assumption, convenient triangular estimates of losses and gains
are exact, and Borjas provides formulas giving the effects on aggregate
output and its distribution, as a function of the magnitude of immigration,
the location of new immigrants, and the parameters of the production func-
tion. The results are intuitive: Aggregate output and the incomes of immi-
grants are maximized if immigrants cluster in the high-wage region. The
net gains to native factors—the higher returns to capital minus the lower
wages to native labor—constitute the increase in aggregate output not
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ter in one region, whether it is the high- or the low-wage region. This
reflects the fact that the inframarginal effect of immigrants, depressing
the wages of earlier immigrants, is greatest when immigrants cluster. The
net gains to domestic factors are smallest when immigrants distribute
themselves evenly across the two regions. These results generalize beyond
the linear marginal product case but have to be qualiﬁed if the elasticities
of the marginal product schedules differ across regions.
Even though the short-run gains to the native population are the same
when immigrants cluster in the low- rather than the high-wage region,
immigrants’location choices are not a matter of indifference to natives.
If, in the long run, native labor migrates so as to eliminate regional differ-
ences in wages, the long-run level of aggregate output and wages will not
depend on where immigrants initially locate. But the costs incurred by
natives relocating will obviously be less if immigrants originally locate in
the regions where wages are high. If the quantity of immigration is suffi-
cient to eliminate the initial wage gap, the economy will be in equilib-
rium without movement of domestic factors, and the relocation costs of
natives will be saved.
Most existing estimates of the effects of gains from immigration have
ignored these regional differences in wages and the way the location
choices of immigrants affect the welfare of natives. A complete accounting
of the gains from immigration requires quantification of the effects just
described, to which Borjas turns next. He takes as a baseline the level of
native income that would initially result if immigrants replicated the geo-
graphical sorting of the native population. He refers to the difference
between this baseline and the gains to natives as the efficiency gain from
immigration—the sum of the benefits from immigrants clustering and
those from the reduction in natives’relocation costs. 
Of course, it is not obvious that immigrants’ location decisions are
determined solely by wage incentives. They could be strongly influenced
by historical settlement patterns or by proximity to their point of entry.
To explore these possibilities, Borjas turns to an empirical examination of
the link between interstate wage differentials and the location decisions
of immigrants and natives, using data from the 1960–90 Public Use Micro-
data Samples of the decennial census. He classifies as immigrants those
individuals born abroad who are either noncitizens or naturalized citi-
zens; all others are classified as natives. He looks at five skill groups
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standardized wage rates for each educational group by state, he estimates
separate wage equations (in logarithms) for each of the census years 1960,
1970, and 1980, controlling for age and sex. These skill-standardized
wages are normalized so that they can be interpreted as the wage differ-
ential, in percent, between the wage of a given state-educational group and
the mean wage in the United States in the same period.
The resulting wage differentials vary widely across states for a given
educational group. For example, in 1980 a college graduate living in
Nevada, a state at the 80th percentile of the earnings distribution, would on
average expect to earn 17 percent more than if he or she lived in Wyoming,
at the 20th percentile. Borjas also finds that, although some states tend to
pay high wages and others low wages, the correlation of wages by educa-
tion across states is far from perfect. Relative wages across states also vary
substantially over time: the correlation between 1960 wages and 1980
wages varies from 0.75 to 0.92, depending on the education group. These
variations allow Borjas to identify the response of immigrants in his for-
mal analysis.
Immigrants have tended to cluster in a relatively few states. In 1990,
74 percent of immigrants who had arrived in the United States within the
past five years lived in one of six states. This clustering might suggest
that social networking and other nonwage considerations are important to
their location decisions. However, Borjas finds that immigrants with dif-
ferent skills tend to live in different states and that where they settle has
changed over time. Although fewer than 20 percent of immigrants who
were high school dropouts lived outside of the six main immigrant-
receiving states in 1990, almost 40 percent of immigrants with a college
degree did so. These facts leave considerable room for economic factors in
explaining location choice.
Borjas proceeds to a more formal examination of the hypothesis that the
relative supplies of immigrants and natives in various states depend on
interstate wage differentials. He measures relative supply by the fraction of
all immigrants in a particular education group arriving in a given five-
year period that live in a given state, divided by the fraction of natives from
that education group residing in that state. This relative supply index is cal-
culated for 1965, 1975, and 1985, the midpoints of the decades for which
Borjas has constructed state wage differentials. Simple tabulation strongly
suggests the importance of wages in determining immigrants’location
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new immigrants relative to native workers in the ﬁve states with the high-
est wages is 2.8, whereas that in the five states with the lowest wages is
0.2. Borjas also shows that the newest immigrants are overrepresented
not only relative to the native population but also relative to earlier immi-
grants, deﬁned as those who had been in the United States for at least ﬁve
years before the date of the wage index. This measure of the relative sup-
ply index varies from 1.2 for the highest-wage states to 0.5 for the lowest,
suggesting that although networking with older immigrants may matter,
purely economic considerations are also important.
These cross-sectional results may be contaminated if immigrants are
attracted to particular states because of unobserved characteristics that
are correlated with wage differentials. The availability of wage and relative
supply information for three different time periods makes it possible to
control for such effects. Borjas does so in regressions of decade-to-decade
changes in the relative supply index on changes in state-education wage
differentials with and without fixed effects for skill level, state, and time.
Initially, these regressions assume the same response of supply to wage
differentials across skills and time. The regressions are run for four relative
supply measures: immigrants relative to natives, earlier immigrants rela-
tive to natives, new immigrants relative to natives, and new immigrants 
relative to earlier immigrants. 
The results generally support Borjas’s hypothesis. Compared either
with natives or with earlier immigrants, new immigrants have a relative
supply elasticity of 1.3. Earlier immigrants appear no more responsive to
wage differentials than do natives. Estimating the equation separately for
the 1960–70 and 1970–80 periods makes relatively little difference to the
qualitative results, although the results are stronger for the 1970–80
period. Borjas also investigates the relationship separately for men and
women and finds that women have a weaker supply elasticity, consistent
with the view that the location decisions of female immigrants are more
heavily influenced by family considerations. Borjas is aware that wage
growth may be correlated with the error in the supply equation, but his
attempt to use the previous decades’wage growth as an instrument is not
very successful, giving unstable results and large standard errors.
Borjas examines the possibility that the results are dominated by Cali-
fornia, where immigrants may cluster because it is close to the Mexican
border, or by Mexican immigrants irrespective of their location. He finds
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ﬁnding, separate regressions for immigrants from Europe, Asia, and Latin
America give similar results. He also finds that natives who choose to
move are more sensitive to wage differentials than earlier immigrants, but
less sensitive than newly arrived immigrants.
The ﬁnding that new immigrants are signiﬁcantly more responsive than
natives to wage differentials suggests that the rate of wage convergence
will be faster among those skill groups and in those periods that experience
high levels of immigration. To test this implication, Borjas first estimates
wage convergence equations for each education group in each of four
decades: 1950–60, 1960–70, 1970–80, and 1980–90. His results are
roughly consistent with earlier estimates on wage convergence, with six-
teen of the twenty time-education coefficients having the expected nega-
tive sign, and with the mean of the convergence coefficients suggesting a
half-life of interstate wage differentials of approximately thirty-ﬁve years.
He then runs a second-stage regression, explaining the estimated conver-
gence coefﬁcients by the ratio of the number of new immigrants relative to
the native population for the particular education group. The results show
a strong and statistically significant relationship between convergence
and immigration. In the 1980s, when immigration increased the supply of
labor by nearly 10 percent, the coefficient estimates imply that immigra-
tion roughly doubled the rate of convergence.
How large are the beneﬁts derived from immigrants clustering in high-
wage regions rather than replicating the geographic distribution of natives?
The answer obviously depends on how rapidly natives respond to wage
differentials. If natives’ migration costs are low and natives respond
rapidly to wage differentials, wage gaps will be short lived and elimi-
nated at low cost, even in the absence of immigration. In this case the
efficiency gains from immigrants seeking out high-wage regions will be
small. If instead native migration costs are high and the response of natives
is slow, the benefits of immigration will be much greater. To arrive at a
back-of-the-envelope estimate of these benefits and clarify the impor-
tance of various parameters to the results, Borjas analyzes a simple, two-
region model roughly calibrated to represent the United States. The model
parallels the earlier static model, but rather than assuming that native labor
and capital are ﬁxed, it is assumed that native migration costs are quadratic
in the rate of internal migration. In both regions Borjas assumes the same
constant elasticity of output with respect to labor, and the same corre-
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quent simulations these elasticities are assumed to be 0.7 and 0.3, respec-
tively, corresponding roughly to a Cobb-Douglas characterization of the
U.S. economy with equal capital in the two regions. Consistent with the
assumption of quadratic costs of internal migration, the log difference in
the regional labor supplies changes in constant proportion to the log dif-
ference in regional wage rates. Given this model, Borjas is able to derive
expressions giving the time path of employment and wages as functions of
the initial distribution of native labor and the quantity of immigrants and
their choice of location.
Armed with these analytic results, Borjas simulates the model roughly
scaled to the U.S. experience, assuming that there are 100 million native
workers, that preimmigration GDP is $10 trillion, and that immigrants
increase the labor supply by 10 percent. A real rate of interest of 3 per-
cent a year is used to discount the stream of costs and beneﬁts. Borjas sim-
ulates the models under a variety of assumptions about the initial
distribution of natives and the attendant wage differential, the magnitude
of migration, the location choices of immigrants, and the cost of internal
migration. If the initial distribution of natives implies a wage gap of
12.2 percent, and immigrants are sufﬁcient in number to close half of that
gap when they all locate in the high-wage region, the efficiency gains are
modest even with relatively high costs of internal migration. The net gains
to native factors are $13.2 billion a year if native workers are completely
immobile, and only $7.9 billion if native workers are mobile but migration
costs are twice the annual income of the average worker. If migration costs
are only half a year’s income, the annualized net gains to native factors fall
to $4.7 billion. Doubling the size of the initial wage differential roughly
doubles these efficiency gains. Although migration costs of two years’
income seem substantial, Borjas observes that the estimates using these
costs eliminate wage differentials much more rapidly than the roughly
thirty-year half-life that other studies have typically found. His model
would require migration costs of three times the average worker’s income
to obtain that slow a speed of adjustment.
Borjas concludes that taking account of how immigrants respond to
wage signals adds importantly to our understanding of the impact of immi-
gration on the U.S. economy. The efﬁciency gains he estimates are in addi-
tion to the conventional estimates, which do not account for the beneﬁts of
immigration clustering in high-wage regions. Although his estimates of the
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double the conventional estimates.
SINCE 1982, THE GROWTH OF THE U.S. economy has been interrupted only
once by recession, in 1990–91. That downturn ended a thirty-one-quarter
expansion and was followed by the current expansion, now forty quarters
old and already the longest on record. Many observers have attributed
this sustained growth to some combination of wise policy, especially mon-
etary policy, and good luck—the absence of large negative shocks like
those that plagued the economy in the 1970s, and the positive productiv-
ity gains from the revolution in information technology. In the ﬁrst report
of this volume, Olivier Blanchard and John Simon hypothesize that some-
thing else has been at work: a long-term decline in the underlying volatil-
ity of output that, by itself, is sufficient to account for the increased
duration of expansions. After quantifying this underlying decline in output
volatility and its implications for the length of expansions, Blanchard and
Simon examine its proximate causes and relationship to inﬂation volatility
and compare the U.S. experience with that of the other Group of Seven
(G-7) large industrial economies.
Blanchard and Simon show that the standard deviation of quarterly
real output growth, measured over overlapping twenty-quarter intervals
or “windows,” declined from about 1.5 percent a quarter in the early 1950s
to less than 0.5 percent a quarter in the late 1990s, although this decline
was interrupted by an increase in volatility from the late 1960s to the mid-
1980s. These simple rolling measures of the time variation in output
volatility are suggestive. But they are vulnerable to the complaint that they
do not take account of variation over time in the economy’s trend growth
or in systematic features of output dynamics. To account for these other
inﬂuences, Blanchard and Simon examine volatility within a more sophis-
ticated framework.
With each twenty-quarter window providing one observation, they esti-
mate a first-order autoregressive (AR) process for the deviation of output
from trend. The rolling window allows time variation in the standard devi-
ation of the residuals, which they interpret as exogenous shocks, and 
in the trend growth rate and the AR coefﬁcient. While acknowledging that
the assumption that the output process is ﬁrst-order does not fully capture
the economy’s dynamics, the authors report that adding more lags to the AR
process does not alter their conclusions; they therefore use the first-order
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pretation of their results. They find that the time pattern of the standard
deviation of the regression residual is nearly identical to the time pattern of
the volatility of output itself. Although the AR coefﬁcient is slightly lower
at the end of the 1990s than in the rest of the sample, the difference is
insignificant, and its variation contributes little to the changes in output
volatility. Their estimated trend growth rate of output does vary substan-
tially, and statistically signiﬁcantly, over the period, but it ends the period
roughly where it starts. It thus appears that the decline in output volatility
comes from a smaller standard deviation of shocks to the output process,
rather than from changes in the other two parameters.
For given parameter estimates and a given distribution of shocks, Blan-
chard and Simon’s stochastic process for output predicts a particular dis-
tribution of the lengths of expansions. To see how nearly such predictions
capture actual experience, they estimate the parameters for two periods,
1947–81 and 1982–2000, thus splitting the sample at the peak of the cycle
preceding the last two expansions. The estimates of the expected trend
growth rate are virtually identical for the two periods, but the standard
error of the shocks in the later period is only half as large as that in the ear-
lier one. This by itself suggests a halving of the volatility of output around
trend in the later period, an effect that is slightly offset by an increase in
the AR coefﬁcient. To determine the implications of these changes for the
expected length of expansions, the authors simulate the model for output
using the parameters for each period. For each period they draw
100,000 shocks from a distribution using the standard deviation of shocks
from that period. They then use these simulations of output to calculate the
median and mean expansion length that the model predicts.
Blanchard and Simon define the beginning of a recession as two con-
secutive quarters of negative growth following an expansion, and the
beginning of an expansion as two consecutive quarters of positive growth
following a recession—the traditional approximation to the official dat-
ing by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). They ﬁnd that
their model replicates the observed lengths of expansions for the two
halves of their sample reasonably well. For example, the simulations give
a mean expansion length of seventeen quarters in the earlier period, com-
pared with an actual mean of nineteen quarters, and a mean expansion of
fifty-one quarters in the later period, compared with an actual mean of
thirty-six. As expected, the decline in the standard deviation of shocks is
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ing their simulations with the volatilities for the two periods switched gen-
erates longer expected expansions in the earlier period (ninety-nine
quarters rather than seventeen) and shorter expected expansions in the sec-
ond (fourteen quarters instead of ﬁfty-one). Switching the AR coefﬁcients
between periods is less important and indeed works in the other direc-
tion: the larger coefficient from the second period shortens the expected
expansion length because an output shock persists longer, making it more
likely that output will decrease two quarters in a row. Switching trend
growth rates makes essentially no difference, because the estimated rates
are nearly the same in the two periods.
The authors recognize that if recessions are usually caused by large,
infrequent events like the OPEC oil shocks or the Volcker disinﬂation, the
reduction in volatility they estimate may simply reﬂect an absence of large
shocks in the last few years. In that case their characterization of the out-
put process may be misleading. Blanchard and Simon examine this possi-
bility in two ways. First, they reestimate the rolling regressions to include
a dummy variable representing quarters of NBER-dated recessions. They
find that removing a large fraction of the output variability during reces-
sions in this way does not qualitatively change their results: the standard
deviation of output shocks still falls substantially, from roughly 1.2 percent
a quarter at the start of the sample to 0.4 percent a quarter at the end. Sec-
ond, they look at the distribution of the residuals from their rolling regres-
sions to see whether there is direct evidence of two kinds of shocks, one
frequent and small, the other infrequent and large. If there were these two
kinds of shocks, one would expect the distribution of shocks to exhibit
skewness or excess kurtosis, or both. Yet except for a brief period during
the 1980 recession, they ﬁnd little evidence of either. The authors also esti-
mate a model where a large shock occurs with a certain probability, and
they ﬁnd they cannot reject the null hypothesis that the probability is zero,
nor can they ﬁnd evidence that it has declined over time.
The time variation in output volatility, and the parallel movements in
the standard deviation of their estimated shocks, could be regarded as a
declining trend over the entire period, interrupted by events in the 1970s
and early 1980s. Or it could be viewed as a structural change that abruptly
shifted volatility down in the early to mid-1980s, reﬂecting, as some have
suggested, improvement in monetary policy or changes in inventory
behavior. The authors suggest that the ﬁrst interpretation is more likely to
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materials prices, most notably oil. These price increases and the ensuing
inflation, and the Volcker disinflation that ended it, are natural candidates
for explaining the increases in output variability. The period of high inﬂa-
tion in the 1970s and early 1980s did, of course, correspond to the period
of high output volatility. But in the 1950s and early 1960s, inflation was
low and output volatility was high. Inﬂation volatility, also measured using
a twenty-quarter rolling window, correlates better with output volatility,
since both are high at the start of the period. A regression of output volatil-
ity on a time trend, mean inflation, and inflation volatility shows all three
to be signiﬁcant.
Blanchard and Simon recognize that correlation is not causation, and
that the correlations among inﬂation, inﬂation volatility, and output volatil-
ity may reflect the influence of another factor such as the supply shocks
of the 1970s. To help sort this out, they look at the experience of the other
G-7 countries, because if supply shocks are common across countries, they
can at least partially control for them by using fixed effects in cross-
country panel regressions. They first note that the experience of most of
the G-7 countries is much like that of the United States. Although the
volatility of output growth varied from 1.5 percent (in Germany) to
1.0 percent (in the United States) in the early 1960s, volatility has declined
significantly in almost all the G-7 countries over the past forty years.
Today their volatilities are strikingly similar, clustering around 0.5 percent,
except in Japan, where the standard deviation of output growth, having
fallen to similarly low levels in the late 1980s, is now higher than it was
at the start of the sample. Since the rise largely coincides with Japan’s
ongoing slump, the authors speculate that decreased liquidity among con-
sumers and firms may have led to stronger responses to cash flow varia-
tions, and that the zero floor on nominal interest rates may have made
monetary policy ineffective in offsetting shocks. They do not pursue these
explanations, but they suggest that Japan is a potentially useful case for
learning about the factors that influence volatility in economies in pro-
longed slumps.
Setting Japan aside, the authors estimate a panel regression relating
each country’s output growth volatility to its mean inﬂation rate and inﬂa-
tion volatility, including time and country fixed effects. Each variable is
time varying, as measured by the same twenty-quarter window used in
the U.S. analysis. If the effects of the supply shocks are indeed common
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put volatility and the inflation variables, after controlling for the supply
shocks. The authors recognize that such common shocks are not likely to
have identical effects on output and inflation across countries, but they
regard this speciﬁcation as a signiﬁcant improvement on the regression for
the United States alone. They also recognize that the panel regression does
not resolve the issue of the direction of causation, because output growth
volatility may cause inflation volatility and because other country-specific
factors may affect both. The estimates do suggest that the level of inflation
is unimportant and that there is a strong and highly significant relationship
between the volatility of inﬂation and the volatility of output growth. The
authors show graphically that the panel regression does quite a good job of
explaining U.S. output volatility, and that its estimated time path resembles
a regular trend decline once the effects of U.S. inflation volatility and the
G-7 time dummies are removed.
At least since Arthur Burns’s 1960 presidential address to the American
Economic Association, it has been suggested that structural changes may
be under way in the economy that would make for a trend decline in out-
put volatility. Burns himself mentioned the change in the composition of
output (the shift toward services), improvements in capital markets, and
automatic stabilizers like the income tax as factors tending to reduce
volatility. The authors explore this line of thought by decomposing GDP
into consumption, investment, government spending, net exports, and
inventory investment, to see how important changes in the volatility of
individual components, the correlation of components, and the relative
importance of components with different volatilities are to the aggregate
story.
The authors compute rolling standard deviations of the rate of growth of
each component times its share of GDP, thereby weighting each compo-
nent’s variation by its importance in the aggregate economy. Weighting
by shares is equivalent to using changes in each component divided by
total output and avoids the difﬁculty, which arises for inventory investment
and net exports, of extreme observations when their level is near zero.
Although the weighted volatilities of net exports and inventory invest-
ment are quite large—indeed, as large as for any other component in the
latter part of the period—the authors do not ﬁnd a clear trend in either. The
volatility of government spending was very high during the Korean War
but has been low ever since. Hence most of the trend decrease in aggregate
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investment. Consumption volatility shows a large decrease in the 1950s
and has been halved since the mid-1960s; investment volatility was much
lower in the 1990s (and briefly in the mid-1960s) than it was for most of
the period. The importance of these declines leads the authors to further
disaggregate consumption into durables, nondurables, and services, and
investment into residential and nonresidential. The volatilities of all of
these components show roughly similar behavior over time, beginning
the sample quite high, declining sharply through the mid- to the late 1960s,
rising in the 1970s and most of the 1980s, and declining to historic lows
during the second half of the 1990s. There are some differences in timing.
The standard deviation of output depends not only on the standard devi-
ations of its components, but also on their correlations. The authors com-
pute time-varying correlations of changes in each component with final
sales, deflated by total output. There is a good deal of time variation in
each correlation, but except for the correlation between inventory invest-
ment and sales, no clear trends emerge. Until the mid-1980s inventory
investment tended to move with sales, amplifying the variance of produc-
tion relative to sales. Since then inventory investment has become coun-
tercyclical, stabilizing output. This decline in correlation is clearly one of
the factors behind the decrease in output volatility. However, it is some-
what puzzling because it occurred when improvements in the tracking
and forecasting of sales, which should have allowed firms to maintain
more stable inventory-to-sales ratios, might have been expected to result in
more, not less, procyclical inventory investment.
Changes in the composition of output have been substantial over the last
fifty years and might be expected to explain a substantial part of the
decline in aggregate output volatility. But the authors find that these
changes roughly offset each other. For example, although the share of rel-
atively volatile nonresidential investment increased significantly between
1950 and today, so did the share of low-volatility consumption of services.
The volatility of a counterfactual series for output growth using the 1947
shares of the various components is nearly identical with the volatility of
actual GDP growth. The authors conclude that composition effects have
had little to do with the general pattern of output volatility over the last
ﬁfty years.
If Blanchard and Simon’s model of expansions and recessions is cor-
rect, recent trends augur well for the stability of the U.S. economy. Not
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economy’s trend growth rate is apparently near the highs of the 1950s
and 1960s. According to their model, the combination of modest shocks
and a rapid underlying trend output growth rate should mean that expan-
sions as long as or longer than the present one will be the norm rather
than the exception. On the other hand, if large shocks such as those expe-
rienced in the 1970s arise from sources outside the model, the estimated
decline in volatility may be misleading, and such promising predictions
could be disappointed. The authors’results, which indicate that high inﬂa-
tion volatility has been accompanied by high output volatility, also suggest
that a change in the benign inflation environment of recent years would
raise the risk of a new recession.
DURING THE LONG ECONOMIC EXPANSION that started in the early 1990s,
consumer spending has been a major source of rising demand, with the
consumer saving rate declining to a historic low in 2000. In recent months,
concerns that the economic slowdown would turn into a recession have
centered on the possibility that consumer spending might weaken signifi-
cantly. That risk is heightened by the decline in the stock market, which
many analysts believe could reduce consumers’spending, both by reduc-
ing their wealth and by dampening their optimism. In this environment
both policymakers and private forecasters have looked to evidence about
consumer sentiment for signs of where consumer spending is heading.
Two popular indicators—the Conference Board’s Index of Consumer Con-
ﬁdence and the Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS) produced by the Sur-
vey Research Center of the University of Michigan—provide monthly
survey-based evidence bearing on consumer attitudes. In the second report
in this issue, Philip Howrey provides an innovative statistical analysis of
the usefulness of the ICS for forecasting.
Many previous studies have analyzed the contribution of the two survey
measures to greater accuracy in forecasting GDP. These studies generally
find that measures of consumer attitudes provide only a small, albeit sta-
tistically significant, improvement in forecasts once other economic vari-
ables are taken into account. Howrey explores a somewhat different
question. Noting that recessions are periods of special interest, with unem-
ployment rising substantially and with output dynamics possibly driven by
atypical responses of economic agents, he devises a method for using
the ICS, alone or in conjunction with other variables, to estimate the
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ties, he starts with a regression explaining GDP growth. Using the coefﬁ-
cient estimates and an estimated distribution of errors, he is able not only
to predict output in successive quarters, but also to compute the probability
that a sequence of shocks will be sufficiently negative so that a particular
future quarter will mark the beginning of a recession. This procedure
requires a statistical rather than a judgmental definition of a recession.
Howrey deﬁnes the start of a recession as the ﬁrst of two or more succes-
sive quarters of decline in a centered, three-quarter moving average of
quarterly GDP growth rates, and the end of a recession as the last of two or
more quarters of negative growth, measured the same way. Recessions
deﬁned this way correspond closely to recessions as ofﬁcially dated by the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Howrey first examines the performance of a single-equation auto-
regressive (AR) model using the ICS and three other indicator variables
frequently used by economic forecasters: the yield spread between ten-
year and three-month Treasury securities, the composite price index of
the New York Stock Exchange, and the Conference Board’s Composite
Index of Leading Indicators. He subsequently examines a vector auto-
regressive (VAR) model using these same four indicator variables along
with three additional economic variables: the inflation rate, the unem-
ployment rate, and the three-month interest rate on Treasury bills. The esti-
mation covers different intervals in the 1960–2000 period, depending on
data availability.
For both the AR and the VAR regressions, Howrey estimates a number
of specifications corresponding to all possible combinations of the four
indicator variables. Using each resulting estimated equation, he then per-
forms 1,000 stochastic simulations with disturbance terms drawn ran-
domly from a normal distribution with a covariance matrix from the
estimated equation. For each quarter, some fraction (sometimes zero) of
these 1,000 simulations result in a recession, and that fraction represents
that specification’s predicted probability of a recession for that quarter.
Since Howrey is interested in probabilities spanning time horizons ranging
from one to four quarters ahead, he applies this method to calculate four
separate probabilities, measuring the likelihood that a recession will begin
in the next quarter, in either of the next two quarters, in any of the next
three quarters, and in any of the next four quarters.
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probability score (QPS) for each specification and time horizon. Each
quarter is assigned a value of 1 if it was actually a recession quarter and 0
if it was not. The difference between this value and the probability of
recession predicted by a particular speciﬁcation measures its error for each
quarter. The QPS is the sum of the square of these errors over the entire
sample period. A perfect forecasting model would have a QPS of zero,
with a recession probability of 1 for each recession quarter and a proba-
bility of 0 for all other quarters. Howrey uses the QPS to evaluate the use-
fulness of the ICS and the other variables in predicting recessions. To do
this he compares the QPSs for all four time horizons and across equation
specifications that span all possible combinations of the explanatory
variables.
Turning ﬁrst to the results with the AR-estimated equations, when each
variable is used alone, the yield spread performs best, producing the low-
est QPS. The ICS does not fare particularly well on its own, although it is
statistically significant. However, when variables are used together, com-
binations that include the ICS always produce the lowest QPSs over most
horizons, and the ICS is always highly significant. The combination of
the ICS, the yield spread, and the stock price index achieves the best score
among all AR specifications for three of the four horizons considered.
Interestingly, overall statistical measures like R2 and the standard error of
the regression produce quite different rankings among speciﬁcations than
does the QPS, which measures only the ability to predict recessions.
Results for the VAR equations differ in the details but also indicate a
role for the ICS in predicting recessions. Since the VAR without any indi-
cator variables is itself a useful forecaster of recessions, it provides a
stronger test of the ICS’s contribution than the AR equations do. The yield
spread generally has less significance in these equations than in the AR
equations, presumably because the other economic variables reﬂect much
of the same information that it conveys. The ICS is signiﬁcant in all equa-
tions. Its QPS performance does not stand out at the one-quarter horizon,
but the specification using just the ICS and the stock price index has the
best QPS over the two- to four-quarter horizons.
Howrey illustrates the performance of this last speciﬁcation by showing
its predictions of recession probabilities before and during each of the past
ﬁve recessions. It does especially well in predicting the large, back-to-back
William C. Brainard and George L. Perry xxix
0099—00 BPEA Editors Sum  7/3/01  12:17  Page xxixrecessions that started in 1980:1 and 1981:4. In the quarter before each of
these downturns, the model indicated the probability of a recession start-
ing in the following quarter as 0.58 and 0.34, respectively, and the proba-
bility of a recession starting in one of the next four quarters as 0.80 and
0.70. In the quarter before each of the other three recessions, the warn-
ings were more muted: the probability of a recession in the next quarter
ranged only from 0.07 to 0.22, and that of a recession starting in one of the
next four quarters ranged from 0.21 to 0.49. Notably, the model emitted no
clearly false signals of recession over the entire period. Applying the
model to the present economy, with data available as of mid-April,
Howrey calculates the probability of recession starting in one of the four
quarters of 2001 as 0.22, which he interprets as a clear warning signal.
THE CURRENT ACCOUNT OF THE U.S. balance of payments has been in
deficit in every year since 1982, with the single exception of 1991, when
a small surplus was recorded. Since 1997 the deficit has much more than
doubled in size, reaching a record $435 billion (4.4 percent of GDP) in
2000. The corresponding net inﬂows of capital from abroad, together with
the sharp appreciation of U.S. equities and other assets in the 1990s,
brought the foreign net investment position in the United States to roughly
$2 trillion at the end of 2000. These developments have led many to ques-
tion whether current account deficits on the scale of recent years are sus-
tainable. The last three papers in this issue, by Richard Cooper, Ronald
McKinnon, and Jaume Ventura, constitute a symposium on the current
account that addresses this question from different perspectives.
WHILE NOTING THAT SEVERAL other countries also have large current
account deficits or surpluses relative to their GDP, Richard Cooper
observes that the sheer size of the U.S. deficit has made it a dominating
feature of the world economy in recent years. But his analysis leads him to
a sanguine assessment of the U.S. position: the deficit does not, in his
view, pose a serious financing problem. Rather than ask how the United
States can continue to attract sufﬁcient capital to “cover” the current short-
fall, he finds it more useful to think of the strength of capital inflows as
causing the current account deficit. For the past two decades foreigners
have, on balance, wanted to buy more U.S. assets than Americans have
wanted to invest abroad. This strong foreign demand for U.S. assets has
influenced the exchange rate of the dollar, and this, together with other
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observed current account deﬁcits. 
This perspective, in which desired capital flows are the main driving
force in the balance of payments, will not be appropriate for all places
and times, but Cooper sees it as central to understanding the present U.S.
situation. He offers a number of reasons why investing in the United States
has been attractive to foreigners. First, U.S. interest rates have been higher
than rates in most other advanced economies, and the returns on U.S.
ﬁxed-income investments have been less risky than those in emerging mar-
ket economies. Second, equity returns in the United States tend to be
higher and more reliable than in other advanced economies, in part
because U.S. business capital-output ratios are lower. Finally, markets for
both stocks and bonds in the United States are more liquid than those in
most other countries, are more transparent, and offer greater protection of
investors’rights.
Given the attractiveness of U.S. assets and the size of the U.S. economy,
which accounts for over a quarter of world GDP, recent rates of net foreign
investment in the United States make economic sense, Cooper argues.
Cooper calculates that the approximately $400 billion by which foreign
investment flows to the United States exceed U.S. investment flows
abroad—the counterpart of the present current account deficit—amounts
to roughly 8 percent of global foreign saving. Allowing for continued
U.S. investment abroad at current levels, total foreign investment in the
United States would have to be a few percentage points more than this
8 percent of foreign gross saving for the U.S. current account deficit to
remain in its present range. Cooper views continued flows of this magni-
tude as sustainable.
He also recognizes, however, that circumstances may change in a way
that reduces the desired level of these investment inﬂows, and he discusses
the likely consequences. The dollar would depreciate, improving the com-
petitiveness of U.S. goods and, in time, reducing the current account
deﬁcit to match the eventual new level of net foreign investment. However,
because this adjustment would occur with a lag, and because expecta-
tions in foreign exchange markets are fragile, the equilibration process
might not go smoothly—the dollar’s depreciation might well overshoot.
Cooper believes, however, that any sharp and substantial depreciation
would probably lead foreign ofﬁcials to intervene to brake the dollar’s fall.
He suggests that European exporters, for example, would strongly protest
William C. Brainard and George L. Perry xxxi
0099—00 BPEA Editors Sum  7/3/01  12:17  Page xxxiany rise in the euro much above the $1.17 level at which it was launched.
In the right circumstances, such as the overappreciation of the dollar in the
mid-1980s, Cooper regards such interventions as useful. And he recom-
mends that the U.S. authorities increase their holdings of foreign exchange
reserves, so that they have the option of taking part in a coordinated inter-
vention should the need arise.
RONALD MCKINNON’S ANALYSIS OF the current account emphasizes the
special role of the dollar in today’s world economy. He observes that most
international financial and commercial business is denominated in dol-
lars, and this makes American banks and other ﬁnancial institutions largely
immune from currency risk, despite the fact that a substantial part of their
deposit liabilities is owed to foreigners. This situation effectively gives the
United States unusual access to credit from the rest of the world. U.S.
ﬁnancial markets and institutions are strong and relatively well regulated,
but McKinnon argues that these features are not the primary reason for
the dollar’s unique status. Rather, he sees the preferred position of the
United States as an international borrower as having arisen serendipitously
from international arrangements that evolved after World War II.
When Japan and the major nations of Europe imposed tight controls
on foreign exchange transactions after that war, and the Bretton Woods
system pegged their currencies and others to the dollar, the dollar became
the only currency in which international transactions could freely take
place. This position of the dollar as “international money” constituted a
natural monopoly, based on economies of scale that provided disincentives
to doing business in a different currency. Thus, once the dollar had become
established as the currency of choice in financial and commercial markets,
the dollar standard was maintained even after 1971, when the Bretton
Woods system of exchange parities broke down, and after the other major
industrial countries liberalized their capital accounts.
McKinnon cites some important macroeconomic advantages to this
special position of the dollar. The United States is free to focus its mone-
tary policy on domestic inflation and output targets, without concern for
the effect of exchange rate changes on the value of its liabilities. He rea-
sons that many countries are reluctant to see their currencies appreciate
against the dollar, for fear of losing competitiveness on world markets, and
are therefore unlikely to resist the accumulation of large dollar reserves.
An important consequence is that the United States faces only a soft con-
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grows in tandem with world output, the United States satisﬁes that need by
issuing liabilities that effectively are never expected to be repaid. This
growth in dollar liabilities to the rest of the world has, in recent years, been
accompanied by rising deficits in the U.S. current account. But McKin-
non notes that a current account deﬁcit is not needed for the United States
to provide liquidity. Gross short-term capital inflows, taking the form of
currency, U.S. bank deposits, and the like, can be accompanied by gross
long-term outflows, such as foreign direct investment, and thus provide
international liquidity at times of current account surplus, as they have in
the past.
Despite these advantages for the dollar, McKinnon sees two types of
problems that could arise if large current account deficits continue. The
first is that the soft borrowing constraint can lead to much greater lever-
aging of U.S. households. This arises because the willingness of foreign-
ers to hold dollars allows U.S. banks and other credit providers to ﬁnance
themselves cheaply abroad to expand their domestic lending. The second
problem is that, other things equal, larger U.S. current account deﬁcits hurt
U.S. manufacturing firms and other U.S. producers. Many economists
would see the damage to manufacturing as simply the result of free com-
petition and the market at work. But McKinnon argues that the dollar’s
unique position biases the market, and that the shrinkage in the U.S. indus-
trial base has been unusually large as a consequence. This in turn threatens
the growth of protectionist measures, which he believes would be easier
to resist politically if the U.S. trade accounts were closer to balance.
Some observers hold that the current account deficits of recent years
are unsustainable and will ultimately lead to flight from the dollar, under-
mining its present international role. McKinnon, however, argues that
the de facto dollar standard will endure under any likely scenario. For
example, some have argued that a slowdown in U.S. growth relative to
growth in the rest of the world would cause a sharp reversal of capital
flows out of the United States. But McKinnon points out that faster
growth abroad would also increase foreign demand for dollar liquidity.
McKinnon also believes that any incipient run on the dollar by private
agents would be offset by the accumulation of official reserves designed
to prevent a sharp dollar depreciation. In his view, only chronic high infla-
tion in the United States would jeopardize the dollar’s role in the inter-
national economy.
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rent account, treating them in the context of a portfolio model aggregated
up to the U.S. macroeconomy as a whole. For this purpose he proposes
an unconventional concept, a “U.S. portfolio,” defined as the sum of all
productive assets located in the United States, plus the U.S. net foreign
asset position. In his model all foreign claims, ranging from Treasury secu-
rities to equity stakes in U.S. assets, are considered U.S. liabilities that dif-
fer only in the degree of risk and liquidity. Thus, for example, he would
treat a Honda plant in the Midwest as a U.S.-owned asset, with a corre-
sponding foreign claim in the form of the foreign equity stake, whereas a
conventional view would treat the Honda plant as an asset owned by a
foreign company.
On either view, U.S. net worth is equal to the value of the U.S. portfo-
lio. But Ventura’s treatment makes a difference when considering the com-
position of the country portfolio and its implications for portfolio
adjustments. For his purpose, the composition is defined by the share of
the net foreign asset position in the portfolio. A negative balance on the
stock of net foreign assets indicates that the U.S. portfolio is leveraged,
with the value of its assets exceeding net worth. Foreign direct investment,
like the Honda plant, is also a form of U.S. borrowing from abroad that
leverages the ownership of U.S. assets, which include the Honda plant.
Under standard portfolio analysis, changes in the relative attractive-
ness of U.S. assets will prompt portfolio adjustments, either inside the
United States or abroad, that change the composition of the portfolio
between net U.S. and foreign assets. But under plausible assumptions such
as constant relative risk aversion, changes in the level of net worth do not
change the desired composition of the portfolio. These considerations lead
Ventura to examine changes in wealth and changes in risk-adjusted returns
as the factors driving current account developments in the past two
decades.
Ventura offers only a cursory explanation for the large current account
deﬁcits from 1980 to 1992. He observes that high U.S. interest rates, stem-
ming from tight monetary policy and large ﬁscal deﬁcits, together with the
international debt crisis of the 1980s, made U.S. assets relatively more
attractive. Portfolio adjustment toward U.S. assets, as predicted by his
model, thus provides a plausible explanation for the increase in capital
inﬂows to the United States that occurred. Ventura calculates that the con-
tinuing net inﬂows steadily reduced the share of net foreign assets in total
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ing negative for the ﬁrst time in the late 1980s.
For most of the 1990s, however, Ventura sees the rise in U.S. wealth driv-
ing portfolio adjustment, and hence the current account. His view of this
period follows from his unconventional treatment of the composition of
the U.S. portfolio. The United States’net indebtedness grew sharply until
1992, representing, in his model, increased leverage of the U.S. portfolio.
When U.S. wealth rose with the stock market boom of the 1990s, U.S.
liabilities to foreigners had to increase to maintain this desired leverage,
beyond the increase in wealth. In Ventura’s model, this portfolio process
explains the large current account deficits of the 1990s. Alongside the
stock market–driven rise in wealth, those deficits have not produced any
signiﬁcant change in the balance between net foreign and domestic assets
in the U.S. portfolio. The share of net foreign assets in total U.S. wealth
ﬁrst rose after 1992, then declined, and then rose again, ending the decade
at about the 1992 share. 
Ventura next turns to some questions raised by his linking of the current
account to the rise in stock market wealth. One question is why the strong
U.S. stock market, if driven by prospects of future profitability as Robert
Hall’s e-capital model suggests, has not led to a desire to raise the share
of U.S. assets in portfolios here and abroad. Two possible answers are,
ﬁrst, that large past gains do not predict comparably large future gains, and
second, that e-capital enhances future profitability abroad as much as it
does in the United States. The most pertinent question for the future of
the current account turns on whether the rise in stock prices will be
reversed, as it was in 2000 for shares in most technology companies. If this
should happen, it would generate a reduction in aggregate wealth and sav-
ing inclusive of capital losses. With the United States a debtor economy,
Ventura’s model predicts that this would lead to a reduction in the current
account deﬁcit. Indeed, he suggests that a quick and steep collapse of stock
prices would require a current account surplus to keep portfolio leverage
from growing. A protracted and gradual market decline would move the
current account to near balance, with a return to moderate deficits as the
growth rate of wealth returns to its longer-term trend.
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